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The	Margin	of	Appreciation	as	an	Underenforcement	Doctrine	
	
Introduction	
		
To	 fix	 ideas,	 consider	 the	 seminal	 James	and	Others	v.	 the	UK	 judgment	 of	 the	 European	
Court	of	Human	Rights	(henceforth	‘Court’	or	‘ECtHR’)	of	21	February	1986.1	It	concerned	a	
challenge	 to	 the	Leasehold	Reform	Act	1967	as	amended,	which	gave	 tenants	 residing	 in	
houses	held	on	long	leases	the	power	to	purchase	compulsorily	the	freehold	of	the	property.	
The	 applicants	 claimed,	 among	 other	 things,	 that	 the	 compulsory	 transfer	 of	 their	
properties	 amounted	 to	 a	 breach	 of	 their	 right	 to	 property,	 protected	 by	 Article	 1	 of	
Protocol	No.1	(P1-1)	of	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	(henceforth	‘ECHR’	or	
‘the	Convention’).	They	argued	that	they	were	deprived	of	their	possessions	despite	the	fact	
that	 the	 ‘public	 interest’	 test,	 set	 out	 in	 the	 second	 sentence	 of	Article	 1	 (P1-1),	was	not	
satisfied,	 since	 their	 properties	were	 transferred	 from	 one	 individual	 to	 another	 for	 the	
latter’s	private	benefit.	In	settling	the	dispute,	the	Court	invoked	the	judge-made2	margin	of	
appreciation	(henceforth	‘MoA’)	doctrine	to	find	that:	
	
Because	of	their	direct	knowledge	of	their	society	and	its	needs,	the	national	
authorities	 are	 in	 principle	 better	 placed	 than	 the	 international	 judge	 to	
appreciate	 what	 is	 ‘in	 the	 public	 interest’	 (...)	 Furthermore,	 the	 notion	 of	
‘public	 interest’	 is	 necessarily	 extensive.	 In	 particular,	 as	 the	 Commission	
noted,	 the	 decision	 to	 enact	 laws	 expropriating	 property	 will	 commonly	
involve	 consideration	 of	 political,	 economic	 and	 social	 issues	 on	 which	
opinions	within	a	democratic	society	may	reasonably	differ	widely.	The	Court,	
finding	it	natural	that	the	margin	of	appreciation	available	to	the	legislature	
in	 implementing	 social	 and	 economic	 policies	 should	 be	 a	 wide	 one,	 will	
																																																																				
1	James	and	Others	v.	the	United	Kingdom,	21	February	1986	(Series	A	no.98).		
2	The	 term	 ‘margin	 of	 appreciation’	 is	 not	 contained	 in	 the	 original	 text	 of	 the	 Convention.	 It	 was	 first	
mentioned	 by	 the	 former	 European	 Commission	 of	 Human	 Rights	 in	 its	 decision	 of	 26	 September	 1958	
concerning	the	inter-state	application	Greece	v.	the	United	Kingdom	and	was	subsequently	expressly	taken	up	
by	 the	Court	 in	 the	case	of	 Ireland	v.	the	United	Kingdom	of	18	 January	1978	 (Series	A	no.25	at	para.	207).	
Protocol	no.	15	amending	the	Convention,	which	was	adopted	by	the	Committee	of	Ministers	of	the	Council	of	
Europe	in	February	2013,	explicitly	mentions	MoA.	Protocol	no.15	was	opened	for	signature	on	24	June	2013	
and	will	enter	into	force	as	soon	as	all	States	Parties	to	the	Convention	have	signed	and	ratified	it.				
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respect	the	legislature’s	judgment	as	to	what	is	‘in	the	public	interest’	unless	
that	 judgment	 be	 manifestly	 without	 reasonable	 foundation.	 (at	 para	 46,	
emphasis	added)							
	
Now,	let	us	suppose	that	the	standards	of	correct	interpretation	and	application	of	Article	1	
(P1-1)	 of	 the	 Convention	 are	 ultimately	 determined	 by	 the	 best	 substantive	 theory	 of	
human	rights,	whatever	that	theory	might	turn	out	to	be	(or,	for	those	who	think	these	do	
not	amount	to	the	same	thing3,	by	the	best	substantive	theory	of	Convention	rights).	On	that	
assumption,	 the	Court’s	 reasoning	 in	 the	 James	case	 is	an	 illustration	of	 the	phenomenon	
that	 constitutional	 theorist	 Lawrence	 Sager	 dubs	 ‘underenforcement	 of	 legal	 norms’.4	By	
invoking	 MoA,	 the	 James	 Court	 declined	 to	 examine	 whether	 the	 deprivation	 of	 the	
applicants’	properties	amounted	to	a	violation	of	Article	1	(P1-1)	of	the	Convention	under	
the	best	understanding	of	the	right	to	property.	Instead,	the	Court	lowered	its	standard	of	
review,	 satisfied	 that	 the	 choices	 made	 by	 the	 British	 legislature	 were	 not	 ‘manifestly	
without	 a	 reasonable	 foundation’.	 Therefore,	 Article	 1	 (P1-1)	 was	 underenforced	 in	 the	
sense	 that	 the	 Court	 invoked	 MoA	 in	 order	 to	 justify	 the	 Article’s	 application	 under	 a	
suboptimal	understanding	of	Convention	rights,	giving	leeway	to	the	respondent	state.					
	
Several	prominent	judges	and	scholars	think	that	this	aspect	of	MoA	is	deeply	problematic.	
Their	objections	take	the	following	general	form.	First,	they	claim	that	the	Court	is	vested	
with	 the	 responsibility,	 formulated	 in	 Article	 32	 (1)	 of	 the	 Convention,	 to	 interpret	 and	
apply	the	Convention	and	its	Protocols	following	the	lodging	of	individual	applications,	 in	
order	to	ensure	observance	by	the	states	parties	and	protect	human	rights.5	Second,	 they	
																																																																				
3	Whether	an	account	of	Convention	rights	maps	perfectly	onto	a	general	account	of	human	rights	or	whether	
there	are	 substantial	discrepancies	between	 the	 two	 is	an	open	and	much	debated	question,	on	which	 this	
chapter	 shall	 not	 take	 sides.	 In	 what	 follows,	 I	 shall	 simply	 refer	 to	 ‘Convention	 rights’,	 leaving	 open	 the	
possibility	that	the	rights	contained	in	the	text	of	the	ECHR	are	reducible	to	human	rights	simpliciter.	
4	See	L	Sager	‘Fair	Measure:	the	Legal	Status	of	Underenforced	Constitutional	Norms’	(1978),	6	Harvard	Law	
Review	at	1213.		
5	See,	for	instance,	the	partly	dissenting	opinion	of	Judge	De	Meyer	to	the	Z	v.	Finland	judgment	of	25	February	
1997:	 ‘In	the	present	case	the	Court	once	again	relies	on	the	national	authorities’	 ‘margin	of	appreciation’.	I	
believe	that	it	is	high	time	for	the	Court	to	banish	the	concept	from	its	reasoning.	It	has	already	delayed	too	
long	in	abandoning	this	hackneyed	phrase	and	recanting	the	relativism	it	implies	(…)	where	human	rights	are	
concerned,	 there	 is	no	 room	 for	 a	margin	of	 appreciation	which	would	enable	 the	States	 to	decide	what	 is	
acceptable	and	what	is	not’.				
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stress	 that	 it	 is	 generally	 accepted,	 not	 least	 by	 the	 Court	 itself,	 that	 this	 responsibility	
standardly	 requires	 determining	 whether	 a	 violation	 of	 a	 Convention	 right	 took	 place	
independently	 of	 the	 views	 held	 by	 respondent	 states. 6 	Hence,	 they	 insist,	
underenforcement	 through	 MoA	 is	 either	 an	 abdication	 of	 the	 Court’s	 interpretive	
responsibility,	or	else	a	doctrine	that	smacks	of	relativism.7	In	a	nutshell,	their	argument	to	
this	conclusion	seems	to	run	as	follows.	The	content	and	scope	of	Convention	rights	depend	
on	 substantive	 considerations.	 It	 is	 either	 the	 case	 that	 states’	 views	 figure	 among	 these	
considerations,	 or	 not.	 If	 the	 latter,	 then	MoA	 appears	 to	 be	 an	 abdication	 of	 the	Court’s	
responsibility	to	make	up	its	own	mind	on	the	relevant	considerations	and	to	use	them	as	a	
critical	 standard	 whereby	 to	 evaluate	 the	 states’	 behavior.8	If	 the	 former,	 then	 MoA	
assumes	that	states’	views	determine	the	content	of	Convention	rights.	But	this	seems	like	
the	 very	 essence	 of	 relativism.	 And	many	 people	 justifiably	 think	 that	 relativism	 cannot	
serve	as	a	robust	foundation	for	Convention	(or	human)	rights.9	
	
In	 this	chapter	 I	attempt	 to	provide	an	understanding	of	 the	underenforcement	aspect	of	
MoA	 that	 can	 deflect	 some	 of	 the	 above	 criticisms.	 The	 key	 idea	 is	 that	 substantive	
considerations	 about	 the	 content	 Convention	 rights	 tell	 only	 part	 of	 the	 story	 of	what	 a	
workable	scheme	of	internationally	justiciable	Convention	rights	is.	The	other	part	is	told	
by	 institutional	 considerations.	 These	 are	 considerations	 that	 apply	 to	 the	 Court	 qua	
decision-maker	by	virtue	of	 its	particular	 institutional	 role	 in	a	 shared	scheme	of	human	
rights	governance	across	contracting	states	of	the	Council	of	Europe.	My	aim	is	to	highlight	
the	 function	 of	 these	 considerations	 in	 explaining	 and	 justifying	 MoA	 as	 an	
underenforcement	doctrine.	My	claim	is	not	that	underenforcement	is	all	there	is	to	MoA.	
Rather,	I	suggest	that	underenforcement	on	institutional	grounds	is	one	plausible	reading	
																																																																				
6	See,	on	this	point,	the	Court’s	well-established	case	law	on	‘autonomous	concepts’,	which	was	inaugurated	
by	 the	 1976	Engel	 and	Others	v.	 the	Netherlands	case	 (Series	 A	 no.22).	 For	 discussion	 of	 the	 ‘autonomous	
concepts’	method	see	G	Letsas	‘The	truth	in	Autonomous	Concepts:	How	to	Interpret	the	ECHR’	(2004)	15(2)	
European	Journal	of	International	Law	279.			
7 	See,	 among	 many	 others,	 the	 opinion	 of	 Judge	 De	 Meyer,	 above	 n.	 5	 and	 Ε	 Benvenisti,	 ‘Margin	 of	
Appreciation,	Consensus,	and	Universal	Standards’,	31	New	York	University	Journal	of	International	Law	and	
Politics	(1998-99)	843.	
8	See,	with	 particular	 reference	 to	 the	 role	 of	 ‘consensus’	 in	 determining	 the	width	 of	MoA,	 G	 Letsas	 ‘Two	
Concepts	of	the	Margin	of	Appreciation’,	26	Oxford	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	(2006)	705.	
9	Judge	De	Meyer,	above	n.	5	and	Benvenisti,	above	n.	7	at	844.	
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of	some	uses	of	MoA.	There	may	well	be	others,	with	which	the	present	chapter	does	not	
take	 issue.10	Throughout,	 the	 argument	 is	 exploratory	 rather	 than	 conclusive.	 I	 intend	 to	
put	 underenforcement	 on	 the	 table	 of	 potentially	 plausible	 alternatives,	 rather	 than	
provide	a	full	defence.	The	chapter	unfolds	as	follows.	I	begin	with	a	general	discussion	of	
underenforcement,	placing	the	phenomenon	within	a	more	general	theoretical	framework.	
This	 opens	 up	 the	way	 for	 a	 conceptualisation	 of	MoA	 as	 an	underenforcement	 device.	 I	
then	 turn	 my	 attention	 to	 explanations	 of	 MoA	 as	 a	 rational	 judicial	 strategy	 under	
conditions	of	resource-bounded	rationality.	Last,	I	offer	an	initial	and	tentative	normative	
defence	 of	 underenforcement	 uses	 of	 MoA	 in	 terms	 of	 subsidiarity	 and	 shared	
responsibility	between	 the	Court	and	States	Parties	 in	 the	 implementation	of	Convention	
rights.	 If	 I	 am	 right,	 then	 views	 criticizing	MoA	 on	 the	 sole	 basis	 that	MoA	 falls	 short	 of	
implementing	first-best	substantive	theories	of	Convention	rights	miss	their	target.			
	
Underenforcement,	Institutional	Considerations	and	MoA	
	
What	does	it	mean	to	say	that	the	Court	underenforces	Convention	rights?	In	the	relevant	
literature,	 more	 than	 one	 attempt	 has	 been	 made	 to	 characterize	 the	 phenomenon	 of	
underenforcement.	 The	 rough	 idea	 is	 to	 distinguish	 between	 two	ways	 of	 implementing	
any	given	legal	norm:	either	‘in	full’	or	‘only	to	a	certain	extent’.	Underenforcement	would	
fall	squarely	within	the	second	category.	Lawrence	Sager,	who	coined	the	term11,	has	in	the	
past	 proposed	 unpacking	 this	 idea	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 distinction	 between	 ‘concepts’	 and	
‘conceptions’.12	According	 to	 Sager,	 the	 concept/conception	 distinction	 corresponds	 to	 a	
distinction	between	‘the	full	conceptual	limit’	of	a	legal	norm	and	a	kind	of	enforcement	of	
the	norm	 that	 falls	 short	 of	 implementing	 that	 conceptual	 limit.13	More	 recently,	Richard	
Fallon	has	suggested	 that	 the	distinction	underpinning	underenforcement	 is	between	 the	
'meaning'	 and	 the	 'implementation'	 of	 a	 legal	 norm.14	Both	 authors	 seem	 to	 point	 to	 a	
crucial	difference	between	the	general	formulation	of	a	 legal	norm	and	an	application	(or	
																																																																				
10	For	some	of	these	other	uses,	see	Letsas,	above	n.	8.	
11	Sager,	above	n.	4.		
12	The	 concept/conception	distinction	has	been	popularised	by	 John	Rawls.	 See	 J	Rawls,	A	Theory	of	 Justice	
(Cambridge,	Mass.	Harvard	University	Press1971)	at	5.	
13	Sager,	above	n.	4	at	1213-14.	
14	R	Fallon,	Implementing	the	Constitution	(Cambridge,	Mass.	2001)	at	38-39.	
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implementation15)	of	that	same	norm	by	a	given	institutional	agent	to	a	particular	case	or	
class	of	cases	such	that,	for	reasons	that	apply	specifically	to	the	agent,	the	general	norm	is	
not	fully	applied.		
	
Even	 though	 the	 distinction	 highlighted	 by	 Sager	 and	 Fallon	 seems	 intuitively	 plausible,	
getting	clearer	on	it	can	be	particularly	elusive.	One	important	source	of	difficulty	springs	
from	 the	 fact	 that,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 considering	 legal	 norms	 and	 their	 implementation,	
there	are	different	and	contestable	ways	of	 carving	up	 the	 conceptual	 field.	Of	particular	
relevance	is	the	fact	that	a	sharp	distinction	between	the	existence	and	the	implementation	
of	 a	 legal	 norm	 seems	 to	 make	 much	 more	 sense	 from	 a	 positivist	 than	 from	 an	 anti-
positivist	theoretical	perspective.16	Authors	of	a	positivist	bent	frequently	speak	of	the	law	
as	 a	 system	 of	 norms	 or	 rules.	 They	 suggest	 that	 legal	 norms	 are	 abstract	 entities	
instantiating	properties	such	as	validity.17	They	also	frequently	claim	that	these	norms	can	
be	identified	independently	of	their	application	to	particular	cases,	through	recourse	to	the	
law’s	 social	 sources.18	Many	positivists	 thus	 contend	 that	 application	of	 legal	 norms	only	
takes	place	at	a	later,	conceptually	second	stage.19	On	the	other	hand,	some	anti-positivists,	
most	 famously	 Ronald	Dworkin20,	 generally	 prefer	 to	 talk	 about	 ‘propositions	 of	 law’	 by	
means	 of	 which	 legal	 rights	 and	 duties	 are	 reported	 at	 different	 levels	 of	 abstraction,	
without	relying	on	a	sharp	distinction	between	independently	identifiable	legal	norms	and	
applications	of	those	norms	to	particular	cases.21	In	the	present	chapter,	I	shall	attempt	to	
take	 these	 important	 jurisprudential	 nuances	 on	 board	 by	 proposing	 an	 abstract	
characterisation	of	underenforcement.	
			
																																																																				
15	Fallon	 (Ibid.	at	 37-38)	 reserves	 the	 term	 ‘implementation’	 to	 denote	 an	 activity	 that	 is	wider	 than	mere	
application	 of	 norms.	 In	 this	 chapter,	 though,	 and	 since	 nothing	 hinges	 on	 this,	 I	 shall	 treat	 both	 terms	 as	
roughly	equivalent.	
16	On	 interpretivist	 theories	 of	 law	 see	N	 Stavropoulos,	 ‘Legal	 Interpretivism’,	 entry	 in	 the	 online	 Stanford	
Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy	 (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/law-interpretivist;	 last	accessed	on	28	August	
2015).			
17	For	a	classic	statement	of	such	a	view,	see	H	Kelsen,	Introduction	to	the	Problems	of	Legal	Theory	(Oxford:	
Clarendon	Press	1992)	at	12-13.		
18	See,	generally,	J	Raz,	The	Authority	of	Law	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1979).	
19	See,	for	example,	J	Coleman,	‘Negative	and	Positive	Positivism’	(1982)	11	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	139.		
20	See,	generally,	R	Dworkin,	Law’s	Empire	(Cambridge,	Mass.	Harvard	University	Press,	1986).	
21	Stavropoulos,	above	n.	16.	
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My	proposal	is	this.	A	legal	norm	is	underenforced	when	there	is	a	substantial	gap	between	
the	ways	 the	norm	should	be	enforced	 in	 the	absence	of	 institutional	considerations	 that	
apply	to	the	enforcing	agent,	as	compared	to	the	ways	the	norm	should	be	enforced	by	that	
same	 agent	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 these	 considerations.	 This	 characterisation	 of	
underenforcement	 avoids	 any	 talk	 of	 ‘conceptual	 limits’	 or	 ‘meanings’	 of	 legal	 norms.	
Instead,	 it	 sets	 out	 a	 rough	 counterfactual	 test.	 The	 core	 idea	 is	 to	 imagine	 a	 decision	
situation	in	which	institutional	considerations	were	absent,	in	order	to	capture	intuitively	
their	 distinctive	 contribution	 to	 outcomes,	 without	 assuming,	 along	 with	 a	 number	 of	
leading	positivists,	 that	 legal	norms	are	 to	be	understood	as	 reified	entities	having	 some	
kind	of	preexisting	‘full	conceptual	content’.	
	
As	 formulated,	 the	 characterisation	 rests	 on	 three	 crucial	 ideas.	 Firstly,	 it	 introduces	 a	
distinction	between	the	existence	and	the	enforcement	of	a	legal	norm.	In	the	way	in	which	
I	intend	to	use	it	in	this	chapter,	the	expression	‘legal	norm’	is	theoretically	innocuous	and	
remains	 neutral	 as	 regards	 rival	 conceptions	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 law.	 It	 refers	 merely	 to	
general	propositions	reporting	legal	content,	i.e.	to	general	formulations	of	legal	rights	and	
duties,	without	taking	a	stance	on	the	kinds	of	facts	that	figure	among	the	determinants	of	
such	content.22	The	distinction	thus	simply	reaffirms	the	commonsense	intuition	shared	by	
most	lawyers	that,	once	legal	content	is	identified	and	formulated	in	general	terms,	there	is	
a	further	step	to	be	taken	in	order	to	apply	it	to	a	concrete	case	or	to	a	class	of	cases.		
	
Secondly,	 the	 characterisation	 deploys	 the	 concept	 of	 enforcement.	 It	 is	 crucial	 to	
emphasise	 that	 ‘enforcement’	 is	used	here	as	an	all-encompassing	 term.	The	 term	refers,	
first	and	foremost,	to	activities	that	include	the	application	of	legal	norms.	These	activities	
typically	aim	at	suitably	connecting	general	legal	norms	with	concrete	sets	of	facts	and	they	
should	be	 familiar	enough	 to	 lawyers	and	 judges	arguing	about	whether	 individual	 cases	
actually	 fall	 under	 the	 extension	 of	 legal	 concepts.	 I	 intend	 to	 add	 a	 further	 conceptual	
component	 to	 this	 traditional	 view	 of	 enforcement-as-application.	 To	 that	 effect,	
																																																																				
22	In	 particular,	 no	 stance	 is	 taken	on	whether	moral	 facts	 figure	 among	 the	determinants	 of	 legal	 content.	
This	 question	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 dispute	 between	 positivist	 and	 anti-positivist	 theories	 of	 law;	 see	 M	
Greenberg,	‘How	Facts	Make	Law’	(2004)	10	Legal	Theory	157.	
7 
throughout	 this	 chapter	 the	 term	 ‘enforcement’	 shall	 also	 refer	 to	 a	 shared	 scheme	 of	
concretisation	of	a	legal	norm	that	links	the	implementing	actor	to	other	actors,	with	which	
the	 first	 actor	 shares	 institutional	 responsibility.23	‘Enforcement’	 in	 this	 second	 sense	
comprises,	 for	example,	 the	creation	by	a	given	court	of	 a	doctrinal	 test	 that	 renders	 the	
content	of	an	abstract	legal	norm	more	concrete	and	at	the	same	time	directs	other	courts	
to	apply	that	test	in	lieu	of	directly	applying	the	abstract	and	general	legal	norm	itself.24		
	
Thirdly,	the	characterisation	brings	into	play	institutional	considerations	as	a	distinct	kind	
of	consideration	and	connects	them	to	underenforecement.	Under	the	characterisation,	an	
agent	underenforces	a	legal	norm	because	special	considerations	of	an	institutional	nature	
apply	 to	 her.	 Some	 of	 these	 reasons	 are	 to	 do	 with	 the	 nature	 and	 limits	 of	 an	 agent’s	
institutional	role	vis-à-vis	other	agents.25	Crucially,	these	reasons	have	a	relational	aspect.	
They	can	only	be	adequately	identified	once	the	agent	is	placed	within	a	wider	institutional	
context	 that	comprises	 the	relationships,	 responsibilities	and	specific	 interaction	 that	 the	
agent	 entertains	 with	 other	 agents	 within	 a	 shared	 scheme	 of	 governance.	
Underenforcement	 thus	 typically	opens	up	the	possibility	of	sharing	enforcement	of	 legal	
norms	 with	 other	 institutions	 in	 a	 common	 scheme	 of	 governance.	 The	 kinds	 of	
institutional	 considerations	 that	 decision-makers	 ought	 to	 take	 into	 account	 crucially	
depend	on	 their	makeup	and	 specific	 characteristics,	 as	well	 as	 the	kind	of	 relationships	
that	 the	decision-maker	entertains	with	other	 institutions	within	the	common	scheme.	 In	
developed	 legal	 systems,	 most	 such	 schemes	 are	 characterized	 by	 complex	 patterns	 of	
institutional	 division	 of	 labour.	 By	 assigning	 the	 primary	 task	 of	 answering	 certain	
questions	to	other	institutions,	underenforcement	helps	allocate	decision-making	authority	
in	 pursuit	 of	 a	 common	 goal.	 Other	 institutional	 considerations	 derive	 from	 intrinsic	
features	of	 the	enforcing	agent.	These	 features	place	constraints	on	 the	kinds	of	decision	
procedures	 that	 the	 agent	 should	 adopt	when	enforcing	 legal	 norms	under	 conditions	of	
bounded	rationality,	uncertainty	and	finite	resources.26	So	institutional	considerations	may	
																																																																				
23	Fallon,	above	n.	14	at	42.	
24	Ibid.	at	38.	
25	A	Kavanagh,	 ‘Judicial	Restraint	in	the	Pursuit	of	Justice’	(2010)	60	University	of	Toronto	Law	Journal	23	at	
27.						
26	See,	generally,	A	Vermeule,	Judging	Under	Uncertainty	(Cambridge,	Mass.	Harvard	University	Press,	2006).	
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be	 such	 as	 to	 explain	 or	 justify	 underenforcement.	 The	 important	 point	 to	 note	 is	 that	
institutional	 considerations	as	 a	whole	are	 to	be	distinguished	 from	substantive	 reasons,	
which	 I	 shall	 roughly	define	as	 reasons	 that	make	 reference,	 in	 law-applying	contexts,	 to	
the	particular	merits	of	the	case	in	the	absence	of	institutional	reasons.		
	
By	 this	 point,	 it	 should	 have	 become	 readily	 clear	 why	MoA	 lends	 itself	 naturally	 to	 an	
underenforcement	reading.	Recall	that	in	the	James	case	mentioned	in	the	Introduction,	the	
Court	 lowered	 its	standard	of	 review	of	 the	measures	 taken	by	 the	British	authorities	on	
two	 grounds.	 First,	 the	measures	were	 not	 ‘manifestly	without	 a	 reasonable	 foundation’	
given	the	public	interest	goal	pursued.	Second,	British	authorities	were	‘better	placed’	than	
the	Court	itself	to	balance	the	right	to	property	with	the	public	interest	aim.27	There	are	at	
least	two	features	that	make	such	invocations	of	MoA	instances	of	underenforcement	of	the	
Convention	 in	 the	 intended	 sense.	 To	 begin	 with,	 like	 the	 US	 Supreme	 Court	 and	many	
other	constitutional	and	supreme	courts	around	the	world28,	the	Court	frequently	refrains	
from	reviewing	the	decisions	of	national	authorities	under	 the	best	substantive	 theory	of	
Convention	rights.	Instead,	the	Court’s	review	consists	in	using	a	‘reasonableness’	standard,	
asking	 whether	 States	 Parties	 exceeded	 it	 or	 not.29	Moreover,	 the	 Court	 explicitly	 states	
that	underenforcement	of	Convention	rights	is	justified	on	institutional	grounds,	to	wit,	by	
the	fact	that	domestic	authorities	are	‘better	placed’	than	the	Court	itself	to	assess	various	
kinds	of	limitations	to	Convention	rights.30	In	addition,	far	from	being	relegated	to	several	
isolated	examples,	 this	approach	 is	prevalent	 in	numerous	areas	of	 its	 case	 law.31	Among	
																																																																				
27	James	and	others,	above	n.	1	at	para	46.	
28	To	provide	just	one	random	example,	the	French	Constitutional	Council	(Conseil	constitutionnel)	commonly	
resorts	to	the	argument	that	its	‘power	of	appreciation’	is	not	the	same	as	that	of	the	legislature,	in	order	to	
lower	its	standard	of	review	of	the	constitutionality	of	Parliament’s	acts.	See,	among	many	other	authorities,	
its	 recent	 decision	 no.	 2013-341	 QPC	 of	 27th	 September	 2013	 at	 para	 6	 (available	 at	
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000028017685,	 accessed	 on	 20	 August	
2015).							
29	For	 an	 extensive	 overview	 of	 the	 recent	 case	 law	 of	 the	 Court,	 see	 Jan	 Kratochvíl,	 ‘The	 Inflation	 of	 the	
Margin	 of	 Appreciation	 by	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights’	 (2011),	 29(3)	 Netherlands	 Quarterly	 of	
Human	Rights	324.	
30	For	the	first	such	use	of	MoA	see	Ireland	v.	the	United	Kingdom	of	18	January	1978	(Series	A	no.25)	at	para	
207.	 The	 Court’s	 dictum	has	 been	 consistently	 used	 in	 the	 quasi-totality	 of	 cases	 invoking	MoA	 to	 find	 in	
favour	of	the	respondent	State.		
31	For	an	overview	see	H	C	Yourow,	The	Margin	of	Appreciation	Doctrine	in	the	Dynamics	of	European	Human	
Rights	Jurisprudence	(The	Hague,	Kluwer	International,	1996);	E	Brems,	‘The	Margin	of	Appreciation	Doctrine	
in	the	Case-law	of	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights:	Compliance	or	Cross-Purposes’	(1996),	56	Zeitschrift	
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other	things,	the	Court	uses	it	when	it	comes	to	assessing	limitations	to	the	rights	protected	
by	Articles	8-11	of	the	Convention.	Regarding	these	Articles,	the	Court	frequently	resorts	to	
the	 argument	 that	 the	 absence	 of	 consensus	 among	 States	 Parties	 affords	 the	 latter	 a	
margin	of	 appreciation	 in	 the	determination	of	 limitations	 to	Convention	 rights,	 typically	
through	balancing	these	rights	with	the	realization	of	collective	goals,	such	as	public	order,	
security,	health	or	morals.32	
	
Conceiving	 of	 MoA	 as	 an	 underenforcement	 doctrine	 explained	 and	 justified	 by	
institutional	considerations	deflects	some	of	the	standard	objections	marshaled	against	it.	
Recall	that,	 in	insisting	that	underenforcement	is	an	abdication	of	the	Court’s	interpretive	
responsibility,	 critics	 of	 MoA	 standardly	 presuppose	 that	 examining	 the	 merits	 of	 each	
individual	 case	 exhausts	 the	 Court’s	 role.	 Now,	 MoA	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 doctrinal	 device	
whereby	cases	are	decided	on	grounds	other	than	their	merits.	By	criticising	MoA	for	this	
reason,	 detractors	 thus	 simply	 assume	 that	 uses	 of	MoA	 could	 be	 justified	 only	 by	 some	
form	of	relativism	in	virtue	of	which	the	content	of	Convention	rights	would	depend	on	the	
moral	 conceptions	 of	 member	 states33	or	 by	 giving	 leeway	 to	 some	 kind	 of	 utilitarian	
calculus	 threatening	 the	 very	 concept	 of	 human	 rights.34	However,	 if	 one	 takes	 the	 view	
that	 institutional	 considerations	 can	explain	 and	 justify	underenforcement	of	Convention	
rights,	 then	 one	 need	 make	 no	 concessions	 either	 to	 relativism	 or	 to	 utilitarianism.	 An	
objectivist	 (as	 opposed	 to	 relativist)	 or	 liberal	 (as	 opposed	 to	 utilitarian)	 theory	 of	
Convention	 rights	 is	 fully	 compatible	 with	 the	 claim	 that	 objectively	 identifiable	 liberal	
rights	 are	 to	 be	 enforced	 in	ways	 that	 depend	 in	 part	 on	 equally	 objective	 reasons	 that	
apply	 to	 the	 enforcing	 agent	 because	 of	 her	 particular	 institutional	 position	 and	
characteristics.	So	underenforcement	uses	of	MoA	would	be	salvaged,	since	they	could	be	
justified	 by	 taking	 into	 account	 institutional	 considerations	 applying	 specifically	 to	 the	
Court	qua	enforcing	agent.	
																																																																																																																																																																																																																										
für	 ausländisches	 öffentliches	 Recht	 und	 Völkerrecht	 240;	 Stephen	 Greer,	 The	 Margin	 of	 Appreciation:	
Interpretation	and	Discretion	under	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	(Strasbourg,	Council	of	Europe	
Publishing,	2000);	Kratochvíl,	above	n.	29.		
32	For	 an	 overview	 and	 a	 critical	 analysis	 of	 the	 Court’s	 case	 law	 regarding	 Articles	 8-11	 on	 limitations	 of	
Convention	 rights	 on	 grounds	 of	 public	 morals	 see	 G	 Letsas,,	 A	 Theory	 of	 Interpretation	 of	 the	 European	
Convention	on	Human	Rights	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009)		at	92-98.			
33	Benvenisti,	above	n.	7	at	844.	
34	Letsas,	above	n.	8	at	729.	
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Explaining	 MoA	 as	 Underenforcement	 of	 Convention	 Rights:	 Resource-Bounded	
Enforcement	of	the	ECHR	
	
If	I	am	right,	the	hallmark	of	underenforcement	uses	of	MoA	consists	in	the	abandonment	
of	 a	 first-best	 understanding	 of	 the	 content	 of	 Convention	 rights	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 looser	
‘reasonableness’	 test	 on	 institutional	 grounds.	 In	 other	 words,	 MoA	 would	 imply	 a	
suboptimal	enforcement	of	ECHR	to	individual	cases.	Such	an	approach	could	be	explained	
and	justified	in	many	ways.35	Given	the	limited	purposes	of	the	present	chapter,	I	shall	here	
only	briefly	sketch	two	kinds	of	arguments.	To	begin	with,	in	this	section	I	shall	present	a	
number	of	explanatory	considerations	pertaining	to	underenforcement	of	MoA	due	to	the	
resource-bounded	rationality	of	the	Court.	The	core	idea	is	that	underenforcement	can	be	
explained	by	 taking	 into	account	 the	 fact	 that,	even	 if	we	abstract	 from	 issues	 to	do	with	
motivation	 and	 strategic	 interaction	 between	 agents	 disagreeing	 about	 the	 optimal	
understanding	of	the	Convention36,	the	effective	application	of	the	ECHR	requires	the	use	of	
scarce	cognitive	resources.	Underenforcement	can	thus	be	explained	as	a	rational	strategy	
of	deployment	of	these	resources	under	conditions	of	pervasive	uncertainty	in	a	context	of	
wider	 institutional	 cooperation.	 In	 the	next	 section,	 I	 shall	outline	a	normative	argument	
designed	 at	 making	 more	 plausible	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 proper	 institutional	 division	 of	 labour	
between	the	Court	and	national	authorities.		
	
In	 what	 sense	 is	 the	 Court	 a	 resource-bounded	 institutional	 agent?	 A	 useful	 way	 of	
introducing	 resource-boundedness	 in	 legal	 interpretation	 is	 by	 distinguishing	 between	
ideal	as	opposed	to	non-ideal	 judicial	decision-making.	Historically,	 idealisation	of	agents’	
capacities	has	been	widely	used	to	model	decision	theory	and	the	theory	of	rational	choice,	
especially	 in	 neoclassical	 economics.37	In	 legal	 contexts,	 ideal	 judicial	 decision-making	
would	be	the	decision-making	of	an	omniscient	legal	interpreter	under	ideal	conditions,	say	
																																																																				
35 	For	 some	 of	 these	 ways,	 see	 D	 Tsarapatsanis,	 ‘The	 Margin	 of	 Appreciation	 Doctrine:	 A	 Low-Level	
Institutional	View’	(2015)	35	Legal	Studies	675..	
36	See,	generally,	A	Vermeule,	The	System	of	the	Constitution	(New	York,	Oxford	University	Press,	2011).	
37 	For	 an	 overview,	 see	 P	 Weirich,	 Realistic	 Decision	 Theory:	 Rules	 for	 Nonideal	 Agents	 in	 Nonideal	
Circumstances	(New	York,	Oxford	University	Press,	2006).	
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that	of	judges	that	are	fully	rational	at	least	in	the	sense	of	holding	perfectly	consistent	sets	
of	 beliefs	 and	 preferences,	 fully	 informed,	 perfectly	 well	 motivated	 and	 capable	 of	
deliberating	without	time	restrictions,	akin	to	Dworkin’s	Hercules.38	Qua	ideal	interpreters,	
courts	 are	 to	 be	 modeled	 as	 frictionless	 institutions	 whose	 activity	 bears	 no	 decision,	
correction	 or	 information	 costs.	 Now,	 idealisation	 of	 the	 various	 capacities	 of	 agents	
frequently	 serves	 to	 define	 an	 optimum	 by	 reference	 to	 which	 normative	 standards	
applying	to	non-ideal	agents	are	defined.	The	task	assigned	to	non-ideal	agents	would	be	to	
approximate	 as	 well	 as	 they	 can	 the	 ideal	 standard.	 In	 judicial	 contexts,	 idealisation	
approaches	 imply	 that	 courts	 ought	 to	 rely	 on	 optimal	 understandings	 of	 the	 law,	 or	
approximate	 those	 understandings	 as	 best	 they	 can.	 To	 take	 an	 example,	 if	 the	 ‘moral	
reading’	of	the	ECHR	were	to	be	considered,	arguendo,	as	the	best	theory	of	interpretation	
of	the	Convention39,	 the	activity	of	non-ideal	 interpreters	would	be	assessed	by	reference	
to	 this	 optimal	 interpretive	 benchmark.	 Transposed,	 say,	 to	 the	 James	 case	 cited	 in	 the	
Introduction,	 this	 approach	 would	 imply	 that	 the	 Court	 should	 have	 either	 attained	 or	
approximated	the	workings	of	an	ideal	enforcer.	As	a	result,	it	should	have	tried	to	identify	
the	optimal	moral	understanding	of	the	right	to	property	and	apply	it	to	the	case	at	hand.	
Far	from	adopting	a	‘reasonableness’	standard,	as	it	actually	did,	and	irrespective	of	the	fact	
that	it	is	a	non-ideal	agent,	the	Court	should	have	taken	up	the	Herculean	task	of	providing	
such	an	optimal	understanding	because	its	role	would	be	identified	by	reference	to	such	an	
ideal	 standard.	 So	 from	 the	 vantage	 point	 of	 such	 a	 benchmark,	 the	 Court	 would	 have	
straightforwardly	failed	to	discharge	its	interpretive	duty.40	
	
Nevertheless,	it	is	well	known	that	ideal	cognitive	and	motivational	capacities	do	not	exist	
in	 the	 actual	 world.	 Human	 epistemic	 agents	 are	 in	 the	 grip	 of	 what	 philosopher	 and	
cognitive	 scientist	 Christopher	 Cherniak	 calls	 the	 ‘finitary	 predicament’41:	 their	 cognitive	
resources	 are	 limited.	 As	 a	 result,	 human	 agents’	 rationality	 is	 resource-dependent	 or	
																																																																				
38	On	the	ideal	 judge	Hercules	see	R	Dworkin,	Taking	Rights	Seriously	(Cambridge,	Mass.	Harvard	University	
Press,	1977)	chapter	4.	
39	On	the	‘moral	reading’	of	the	ECHR	see	G	Letsas,	“The	ECHR	as	a	Living	Instrument”	in	A	Føllesdal,	B	Peters	
and	G	Ulfstein	 (eds),	Constituting	Europe:	The	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	 in	a	National,	European	and	
Global	Context	(New	York,	Cambridge	University	Press,	2013).			
40	Ibid.	
41	See	C	Cherniak,	Minimal	Rationality	(Cambridge,	MIT	Press,	1986).		
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bounded.		Bounded	rationality	approaches	in	general,	whether	in	law	or	in	other	domains,	
challenge	models	 of	 human	 decision-making	 based	 on	 idealisation	 strategies.	 Instead	 of	
supposing	that	optimal	normative	standards	set	the	benchmark	against	which	the	activity	
of	 non-ideal	 agents	 should	 be	 evaluated,	 these	 approaches	 purport	 to	 accommodate	
cognitive	limitations	by	lowering	the	relevant	normative	standard	itself.	Resource-bounded	
approaches	 thus	 focus	 on	 how	 agents	 with	 limited	 information,	 time	 and	 cognitive	
capacities	 rationally	 ought	 to	make	 judgments	 and	 decisions.	 These	 approaches	 became	
particularly	prominent	since	the	1970s,	when	an	impressive	array	of	experimental	results	
suggested	 that	 human	 agents	 reason	 and	 decide	 in	 ways	 that	 systematically	 violate	 the	
formal	 canons	 of	 rationality.42	Bounded	 rationality	 models	 attribute	 at	 least	 part	 of	 the	
explanation	 for	 these	 shortcomings	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 cognitive	 resources	 available	 to	 these	
agents	 in	 particular	 circumstances.	 Charting	 the	 actual	 limits	 of	 these	 resources	 is	 an	
important	 part	 of	 cognitive	 science	 and	 empirical	 psychology.	 Both	 conceptualize	 the	
human	mind	 as	 a	 finite	 information-processing	 device,	 strictly	 limited	with	 regard	 to	 its	
memory,	attention	and	computation	capacities.43		
	
Empirical	findings	pertaining	to	the	bounded	cognitive	resources	of	finite	agents	impact	on	
understandings	 of	 the	 normative	 benchmark	 against	 which	 to	 evaluate	 the	 cognitive	
performance	 of	 finite	 agents	 in	 the	 following	 way.	 Instead	 of	 supposing,	 as	 idealisation	
approaches	 generally	 do,	 that	 the	 task	 of	 these	 agents	 is	 to	 approximate	 ideal	 decision-
making	 as	 best	 they	 can,	 bounded	 rationality	 accounts	 ask	 which	 reasoning	 strategies	
agents	with	cognitive	resources	ought	to	follow	in	order	to	reliably	attain	sets	of	specified	
epistemic	goals	for	different	kinds	of	environments.44	Accordingly,	the	strategies	identified	
are	resource-dependent:	they	are	tailored	to	the	actual	cognitive	abilities	and	resources	of	
finite	agents.	Resource-dependence	as	a	constraint	on	the	selection	of	reasoning	strategies	
can	be	 justified	 in	 two	ways.	The	 first	 appeals	 to	 ‘ought-implies-can’	 considerations.	 In	 a	
nutshell,	 the	 argument	 is	 that	 it	 is	 not	 rational	 to	 ask	 of	 agents	 that	 they	 comply	 with	
epistemic	norms,	 compliance	with	which	 is	 impossible,	 given	 the	agents’	 actual	 cognitive	
																																																																				
42	For	an	overview	see	D	Kahneman,	Thinking	Fast	and	Slow	(New	York,	Farrar,	Straus	and	Giroux,	2011).		
43	See	 B	 E	 Goldstein,	 Cognitive	 Psychology:	 Connecting	 Mind,	 Research	 and	 Everyday	 Experience	 (Belmont,	
Wadsworth,	2011).	
44	See	G	Gigerenzer	and	R	Selten,	Bounded	Rationality:	The	Adaptive	Toolbox	(Cambridge,	MIT	Press,	2001).		
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setup.45	Whilst	the	exact	meaning	of	the	‘can’	part	of	this	‘ought-implies-can’	constraint	has	
turned	out	to	be	controversial46,	still	it	clearly	rules	out	at	least	certain	kinds	of	reasoning	
strategies	(e.g.	those	that	are	computationally	intractable	absent	infinite	time).	The	second	
appeals	to	cost/benefit	considerations.47	It	follows	from	resource-relativity	that	reasoning	
strategies	 come	 at	 varying	 costs.	 Some	 can	 be	 more	 expensive	 than	 others.	 Identifying	
reasoning	strategies	at	acceptable	cognitive	costs	thus	forms	a	major	part	of	the	motivation	
behind	resource-bounded	approaches.	Here	again,	one	main	idea	is	that	reliability	can	be	
traded	 off	 against	 other	 values,	 such	 as	 speed	 in	 decision-making.48	Moreover,	 reliability	
can	 be	 the	 collective	 outcome	 of	 the	 distribution	 of	 tractable	 cognitive	 tasks	 between	
various	 cooperating	 agents,	 rather	 than	 the	 result	 of	 the	 exercise	 of	 a	 solitary	 agent’s	
cognitive	capacities.49		
	
This	general	point	about	the	efficient	deployment	of	scarce	cognitive	resources	also	applies	
to	 judicial	 decision-making	 and	 thus	 to	 the	 ECtHR.	 In	 the	 actual	 world,	 courts	 function	
under	 non-ideal	 conditions.	 Judges’	 rationality	 is	 bounded50,	 their	 access	 to	 pertinent	
information	 is	 limited,	 their	 information-processing	capacity	 is	both	restricted	and	 in	 the	
grip	 of	 various	 cognitive	 biases,	 their	memory	 and	 attentional	 resources	 are	 restricted51	
and	 they	 are	 under	 relentless	 time	 pressure,	 amplified	 by	 the	 ever-increasing	 volume	 of	
their	caseload.		Under	these	circumstances,	resource-bounded	approaches	underline	that	it	
is	 not	 enough	 that	 reasoning	 strategies	 score	 high	 on	 the	 reliability	 dimension,	 as	
idealisation	 approaches	 generally	 suppose.	 It	 is	 important	 that	 they	 also	 come	 at	 an	
acceptable	cost	with	regard	to	the	finite	cognitive	resources	of	judges.	Thus,	to	come	back	
to	the	problem	of	enforcement	of	the	ECHR,	resource-bounded	models	of	decision-making	
insist	that	reasoning	strategies	connecting	political	morality	with	the	content	of	Convention	
																																																																				
45	P	Thagard,	 ‘From	the	Descriptive	 to	 the	Normative	 in	Psychology	and	Logic’,	 (1982)	49	 (1)	Philosophy	of	
Science	24.	
46	See	eg	R	Feldman	and	E	Conee,	‘Evidentialism’,	(1985)	48	Philosophical	Studies	15.		
47	See	generally	M	Bishop	and	J	D	Trout,	Epistemology	and	the	Psychology	of	Human	Judgment	(Oxford,	Oxford	
University	Press,	2005).	
48	Ibid.	
49	F	 D’Agostino,	 Naturalizing	 Epistemology:	 Thomas	 Kuhn	 and	 the	 ‘Essential	 Tension’	 (Palgrave	 Macmillan,	
2010).	
50	Vermeule,	above	n.	36	at	154-156.	
51	For	an	overview	see	N	Lavie,	‘Distracted	and	Confused?	Selective	Attention	Under	Load’	(2005)	5	Trends	in	
Cognitive	Science	75.	
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rights,	 such	 as	 the	moral	 reading	 of	 the	 ECHR,	 take	 account	 of	 the	 limitations	 of	 judges’	
cognitive	resources.	Even	if	the	relevant	moral	and	empirical	facts	would	be	accessible	to	
idealised,	 i.e.	 resource-independent,	 judges,	 resource-bounded	 approaches	maintain	 that	
we	still	ought	to	ask,	first,	whether	these	facts	are	also	in	principle	accessible	to	resource-
dependent	judges	and,	second,	at	what	costs.	
	
Now,	 considerations	 to	 do	 with	 the	 resource-dependence	 of	 judicial	 decision-making	
appear	 to	 be	 able	 to	 straightforwardly	 explain	 instances	 of	 underenforcement	 doctrines,	
such	as	MoA.	The	core	idea	is	that	finite	bona	fide	 judicial	agents	can	rationally	choose	to	
simplify	their	cognitive	tasks	by	sometimes	opting	for	a	lower	‘reasonableness’	standard	of	
review	than	for	review	based	on	an	optimal	understanding	of	the	relevant	standard.	In	the	
context	of	the	ECHR,	this	is	especially	the	case	when	the	Court	is	justifiably	uncertain	about	
the	 consequences	 of	 its	 decisions,	 both	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 merits	 of	 the	 individual	 case	
before	 it	 and	 to	 its	 more	 wide	 systemic	 effects,	 insofar	 as	 these	 effects	 can	 alter	 the	
enforceability	 of	 European-wide	 understandings	 of	 Convention	 rights.	 In	 cases	 of	
uncertainty,	 the	 Court	 can	 use	 underenforcement	 doctrines,	 such	 as	 MoA,	 to	 outsource	
decision-making	 to	 trusted	 national	 authorities,	 if	 it	 has	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	 these	
decision-makers	may	be	more	reliable,	with	respect	 to	a	certain	range	of	 issues,	 than	the	
Court	itself.	Moreover,	such	a	practice	can	result	in	considerable	gains	in	time,	which	is	also	
an	independently	identifiable	crucial	variable.	
	
We	 can	 use	 two	 kinds	 of	 examples	 from	 the	 Court’s	 case-law	 to	 briefly	 illustrate	 these	
general	points.	To	begin	with,	there	are	situations,	such	as	the	one	exemplified	in	the	James	
case	cited	in	the	Introduction,	in	which	determining	whether	a	violation	of	the	Convention	
actually	took	place	seemingly	requires	subtle	processing	of	particularly	complex	empirical	
information.	 In	 cases	 such	 as	 James,	 which	 are	 to	 do	 with	 reviewing	 the	 economic	 and	
social	 policy	 of	 States	 Parties52,	 it	 is	 doubtful	 whether	 the	 Court	 can	 process	 empirical	
information	 more	 reliably	 than	 national	 institutions.	 Typically,	 in	 such	 cases	
implementation	 of	 the	 Convention	 takes	 the	 form	 of	 a	 rather	 complex	 cognitive	
																																																																				
52	For	an	overview	of	the	Court’s	case-law	in	this	area	see	Tsarapatsanis,	above	n.	35	at	694-697.	
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cooperation	between	institutions:	legislatures	set	out	general	norms,	the	executive	uses	its	
expertise	to	further	concretise	these	norms	and	domestic	courts,	at	 least	in	States	Parties	
that	have	incorporated	the	Convention53,	independently	check	for	ECHR	violations.	It	could	
thus	make	 sense	 to	 allocate	 a	 substantial	 part	 of	 the	 decision-making	 power	 to	 national	
institutions	via	MoA	under	two	broad	conditions.	First,	the	Court	must	have	good	reasons	
to	trust	that	the	decision-making	competence	of	the	institutions	to	which	a	substantial	part	
of	 decision-making	 power	 is	 allocated	 is	 higher	 than	 its	 own.	 If	 that	 is	 not	 the	 case,	 for	
example	because	the	Court	has	found	out	from	its	own	experience	that	a	particular	Member	
State’s	 judicial	 institutions	systematically	fail	to	protect	certain	kinds	of	rights	or	that	the	
Court	 itself	 can	 do	 a	 better	 job	 at	 protecting	 those	 rights,	 then	 it	 has	 a	 powerful	
countervailing	reason	to	review	from	scratch	the	decisions	of	national	authorities.	Second,	
insofar	 as	 the	 Court	 uses	MoA	 to	 underenforce	 but	 not	 to	 refuse	 to	 enforce	 Convention	
norms,	 it	has	 to	discharge	 its	duty	of	 reviewing	alleged	breaches	of	Convention	rights	by	
establishing	 a	 workable	 threshold	 and	 by	 making	 clear	 to	 national	 authorities	 that	
decisions	above	that	threshold	will	trigger	a	full	exercise	of	the	Court’s	powers	of	review.	
Again,	 this	 is	 exactly	what	happened	 in	 the	 James	case,	 in	which	 the	Court	explicitly	 said	
that	 the	 determination	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 public	 interest	 by	 the	 British	 legislature	 was	
deemed	 to	be	 in	accordance	with	 the	Convention	because	 the	 legislature’s	 judgment	was	
not	found	to	be	‘manifestly	without	a	reasonable	foundation’.	
	
As	a	second	example,	take	time.	Suppose	that	part	of	the	difficulty	of	deciding	cases	under	a	
moral	reading	of	the	ECHR	stems	from	the	fact	that	complex	factors	have	to	be	taken	into	
account,	which	 judges	 do	 not	 have	 enough	 time	 to	 calculate	 in	 their	 totality,	 in	 order	 to	
arrive	at	an	acceptable	degree	of	 certainty.	 If	 the	Court	had	more	 time,	 it	 could	arguably	
score	 better	 on	 the	 reliability	 dimension,	 by	 scrupulously	 attempting	 to	 calculate	 them.	
However,	 the	 Court	 does	 not	 have	 infinite	 time.	 In	 fact,	 its	 time	 is	 a	 particularly	 scarce	
resource,	which	it	has	to	allocate	in	both	an	efficient	and	a	just	way.	Again,	depending	on	
the	 circumstances	 in	 which	 it	 is	 placed,	 the	 Court	 can	 sometimes	 reasonably	 trade	 off	
marginal	increases	in	reliability	for	speed	by	following	underenforcement	doctrines,	which	
																																																																				
53	L	Helfer,	‘Redesigning	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights:	Embeddedness	as	a	Deep	Structural	Principle	
of	the	European	Human	Rights	Regime’,	(2008)	19(1)	European	Journal	of	International	Law	125	at	141-149.	
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bring	 into	play	 the	cognitive	capacities	of	national	authorities.	Following	Andrew	Coan54,	
we	 can	use	 the	 expression	 ‘judicial	 capacity’	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 actual	 ability	 of	 the	 Court	 to	
adequately	handle	a	given	volume	of	cases	within	a	given	amount	of	time,	whilst	assuming	
the	Court’s	adherence	to	certain	qualitative	standards	of	decision-making.	Now,	despite	the	
fact	 that	 many	 writers	 frequently	 point	 to	 the	 ‘case	 overload	 crisis’	 confronted	 by	 the	
Court,55	to	 this	 day	 no	 systematic	 attempts	 appear	 to	 have	 been	 made	 to	 proceed	 to	 a	
specific	 analysis	 of	 judicial	 capacity	 qua	 institutional	 consideration	 and	 to	 link	 it	 to	
underenforcement	doctrines,	such	as	MoA.	However,	such	a	link	appears	quite	direct,	since	
capacity	is	intimately	related	to	the	allocation	of	time	as	a	scarce	cognitive	resource.	In	the	
Court’s	 case,	 the	 demand	 to	 decide	 cases	 in	 a	 timely	 and	 efficient	 manner	 is	 formally	
recognised	as	a	special	judicial	duty,	unambiguously	set	out	in	Article	6	of	the	Convention.	
Underenforcing	Convention	rights	through	uses	of	MoA,	which	entails	sharing	enforcement	
responsibility	with	national	institutions,	can	thus	be	a	rational	response	to	capacity-related	
pressures,	by	allowing	for	considerable	gains	in	time.	This	strategy,	moreover,	is	anything	
but	unfamiliar.	The	Court	itself,	in	its	Preliminary	Opinion	on	the	subject	of	case	overload56,	
proposed	a	number	of	concrete	institutional	reforms	to	remedy	‘the	mismatch	between	the	
Court’s	workload	and	its	capacity’.57	One	leading	idea	is	for	the	Court	to	allocate	more	time	
and	 resources	 to	 the	examination	of	 so-called	 ‘priority	 cases’58	than	 to	 cases	 for	which	 it	
can	 reasonably	 assume	 that	 national	 enforcing	 authorities	will	 be	 at	 least	 equally	 apt	 at	
dealing	 with.	 Besides,	 underenforcement	 through	 MoA	 is	 exactly	 how	 the	 Court	 has	
proceeded	in	cases	in	which	national	courts	have	already	provided	detailed	legal	analysis	
based	on	the	principles	and	criteria	set	out	in	the	Court’s	case	law.	In	these	cases,	the	Court	
has	used	MoA	to	suggest	that	departures	from	the	outcome	arrived	at	by	national	courts	is	
acceptable	only	for	‘strong	reasons’.	For	example,	in	the	recent	Palomo	Sánchez	and	Others	
v.	Spain	case,	which	was	about	balancing	the	right	to	freedom	of	expression	under	Article	
10	of	the	Convention	with	the	right	to	protection	of	one’s	reputation,	the	Court	held	that:	
	
																																																																				
54	A.	Coan	‘Judicial	Capacity	and	the	Substance	of	Constitutional	Law’	(2012)	122	Yale	Law	Journal	100	at	102.		
55	See	eg	S.	Greer,	‘What’s	Wrong	with	the	European	Convention’	(2008)	30	Human	Rights	Quarterly	680.	
56See	the	Preliminary	Opinion	of	 the	Court	 in	Preparation	of	 the	Brighton	Conference	of	20	February	2012,	
(http://echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_Opinion_ENG.pdf,		last	accessed	on	20	August	2015).			
57	Preliminary	Opinion	above	n	52	at	para	5.	
58	Preliminary	Opinion	above	n	52	at	para	24.	
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If	 the	 reasoning	 of	 the	 domestic	 courts’	 decisions	 concerning	 the	 limits	 of	
freedom	of	 expression	 in	 cases	 involving	 a	person’s	 reputation	 is	 sufficient	
and	consistent	with	the	criteria	established	by	the	Court’s	case-law,	the	Court	
would	require	strong	reasons	to	substitute	its	view	for	that	of	the	domestic	
courts59	
	
My	 suggestion	 is	 that	 the	 use	 of	MoA	 as	 an	 underenforcement	 doctrine	 in	 cases	 such	 as	
Palomo	Sánchez	can	be	explained	by	capacity	concerns.	 It	can	be	rational	 for	the	Court	to	
cut	 down	 on	 its	 decision	 costs	 by	 externalising	 part	 of	 these	 costs	 to	 national	 judicial	
institutions.	The	rationality	of	such	outsourcing	hinges	on	national	courts	using	the	Court’s	
criteria	 to	 determine	whether	 an	 infringement	 of	 the	ECHR	 took	place.	 This	 implies	 that	
national	 courts	will	 arrive	 at	decisions	which	 reflect	 the	Court’s	 own	mode	of	 reasoning.	
The	Court	will	 then	pass	 judgment	 on	 the	 cases	without	having	 to	 examine	 anew	all	 the	
relevant	 factors.	 Accordingly,	 it	 will	 be	 in	 a	 position	 to	 decide	 cases	more	 quickly,	 thus	
enhancing	its	overall	capacity.	
	 	
Justifying	MoA	as	Underenforcement	of	 Convention	Rights:	Normative	 Institutional	
Considerations	
	
Let	us	suppose,	arguendo,	 that	resource-bounded	accounts	are	on	the	right	 track	when	 it	
comes	 to	 providing	 an	 explanation	 of	 underenforcement	 uses	 of	 MoA.	 Still,	 it	 could	 be	
argued,	resource-boundedness	can	only	provide	an	extremely	thin	normative	basis	for	such	
uses.	After	all,	every	agent	that	is	under	a	duty	to	enforce	the	ECHR	is	resource-bounded,	be	
it	 the	 Court	 or	 national	 authorities,	 including	 national	 courts.	 As	 already	 observed,	
underenforcement	through	MoA,	which	implies	qualified	deference	to	the	decisions	made	
by	national	authorities	on	the	resolution	of	disputes	to	do	with	Convention	rights,	can	be	
fully	justified,	if	at	all,	only	by	appealing	to	normative	institutional	considerations	aimed	at	
the	proper	division	of	power	between	the	Court	and	national	authorities.	In	this	last	section,	
																																																																				
59 	Palomo	 Sánchez	 and	 Others	 v.	 Spain	 [GC],	 nos	 28955/06,	 28957/06,	 28959/06	 and	 28964/06,	 12	
September	 2011	 at	 para.	 57;	 in	 the	 same	 vein	 see	MGN	 Limited	 v.	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 no.	 39401/04,	 18	
January	 2011	 (at	 paras.)	 and	 Axel	 Springer	 AG	 v.	 Germany	 (no.2)	 [GC],	 nos.	 40660/08	 and	 60641/08,	 7	
February	2012	(at	para.	88).	
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I	 shall	 briefly	 chart	 three	 such	 kinds	 of	 considerations	 in	 order	 to	 lend	 some	 normative	
plausibility	to	underenforcement	uses	of	MoA.	These	pertain,	first,	to	shared	responsibility	
in	 the	 enforcement	 of	 the	 ECHR	 between	 the	 Court	 and	 national	 authorities,	 second,	 to	
subsidiarity	and,	third,	to	legitimacy	concerns.	
	
A.	Shared	Responsibility			
	
Whilst	 it	 is	 true	 that	 the	ECtHR	 is	a	 judicial	 institution	whose	duty	 is	 to	 resolve	disputes	
involving	 individuals	 on	 alleged	 violations	 of	 Convention	 rights,60	reducing	 the	 Court’s	
function	to	that	of	a	dispute	resolution	mechanism	would	be	a	mistake.	In	fact,	the	Court	is	
placed	within	a	wider	and	complex	division	of	institutional	labour.	First,	the	Court	typically	
supervises	 national	 institutions	 on	 Convention	matters.	 Insofar	 as	 it	 lacks	 in	 democratic	
legitimacy,	it	must	make	use	of	its	institutional	independence	with	care,	paying	due	respect	
to	the	political	decisions	of	democratically	elected	national	legislatures.61	Second,	the	Court	
must	 also	 pay	 attention	 to	 the	 systemic	 effects	 of	 its	 judgments	 in	 the	 overall	 project	 of	
enforcement	 of	 the	 Convention.62	Thus,	 far	 from	 merely	 interpreting	 the	 Convention	 or	
applying	 it	 to	 individual	 cases	 under	 its	 best	 understanding	 of	 Convention	 rights	 in	 the	
abstract,	 the	 Court	 also	 assumes	 a	 central	 coordinating	 role	 in	 enforcing	 it,	 by	 closely	
cooperating	with	national	authorities.	
	
Enforcement	 of	 the	 Convention	 is	 not	 a	 task	 that	 various	 national	 and	 supranational	
institutions	could	perform	in	isolation.	Rather,	it	is	a	collective	endeavour,	which	requires	
meticulous	 efforts	 at	 close	 collaboration.	 In	 this	 joint	 endeavour,	 the	 Court	 and	 national	
institutions	enter	as	partners.	At	the	very	least,	this	entails	that	the	Court	ought	to	take	its	
																																																																				
60	Formally	decisions	by	the	Court	only	have	an	inter	partes	legal	effect;	it	is	debatable	whether	they	also	have	
erga	omnes	legal	 force	and,	 if	 so,	on	which	basis.	 See	 Judge	Boštjan	M.	Zupancic,	Constitutional	Law	and	the	
Jurisprudence	of	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights:	An	Attempt	at	a	Synthesis,	(2001)	2	German	Law	Journal	
(available	 at	 http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=30,	 last	 accessed	 on	 20	
August	2015).	
61	See	generally	D	Kyritsis,	‘Constitutional	Review	in	Representative	Democracy’	(2012)	32(2)	Oxford	Journal	
of	Legal	Studies	297	at	315-318.	
62	On	some	of	these	systemic	effects,	see	Helfer,	above	n.	53	at	134-138;	L	Helfer	and	E	Voeten,	‘International	
Courts	 as	 Agents	 of	 Legal	 Change:	 Evidence	 from	 the	 LGBT	 Rights	 in	 Europe’	 (2014)	 68(2)	 International	
Organization	1.	
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partners’	 bona	 fide	 judgments	 regarding	 the	 content	 of	 Convention	 rights	 seriously,	
especially	 insofar	 as	 some	 partners	 wield	 democratic	 legitimacy.	 Because	 of	 the	
partnership,	national	institutions	are	jointly	responsible	with	the	Court	for	respecting	and	
promoting	 Convention	 rights.	 This	 collaborative	 aspect	 is	 recognised	 by	 Article	 1	 of	 the	
Convention,	 which	 makes	 it	 a	 duty	 for	 national	 authorities	 to	 protect	 and	 uphold	
Convention	 rights.63		 Likewise,	 Article	 13	 instructs	 States	 Parties	 to	 provide	 effective	
domestic	 remedies	 for	 individuals	 alleging	 violations	 of	 their	 ECHR	 rights.64	Moreover,	
most	States	Parties	have	incorporated	the	Convention	in	their	domestic	legal	systems,	thus	
creating	 an	 obligation	 addressed	 to	 national	 legislatures	 and	 courts	 to	 comply	 with	 the	
ECHR	and	use	it	actively	in	their	own	decision-making.65	Under	the	ECHR	partnership,	the	
Court	 trusts	 that	national	 institutions	shall	use	 their	distinctive	abilities	and	resources	 to	
give	pride	of	place	to	its	reasoning,	so	as	to	infuse	their	decision-making	with	Convention	
rights	considerations	in	their	ordinary	functioning.66	
	
Combining	resource-boundedness	with	joint	responsibility	with	national	authorities	in	the	
enforcement	of	the	Convention	can	justify	underenforcement	uses	of	MoA	in	the	following	
way.	Under	conditions	of	uncertainty,	bounded	rationality	and	time	pressure,	members	of	
the	Court	are	sometimes	confronted	with	a	difficult	institutional	choice:	should	they	always	
try	 to	 identify	 as	 best	 as	 they	 can	 the	 relevant	 substantive	 considerations	 of	 the	 case	 at	
hand	irrespective	of	their	relationships	with	national	institutions,	or	should	they	rather,	at	
least	in	some	circumstances,	invoke	MoA	to	underenforce	the	Convention	and	defer	to	the	
judgment	of	national	institutions	if	they	are	justified	in	thinking	that	these	institutions	are	
more	likely	to	reach	a	correct	decision?	Reasons	of	trust	suggest	that	deference	to	bona	fide	
partners	can	sometimes	be	a	 justified	option.	Under	certain	circumstances,	 the	Court	can	
legitimately	conclude	that	national	institutions,	because	of	their	specific	characteristics	and	
abilities,	 are	 better	 placed	 than	 the	 Court	 itself	 to	 pass	 judgment	 on	 a	 number	 of	
contentious	 issues.	 As	 part	 of	 a	 larger	 political	 project,	 the	 Court	 relies	 on	 others	 not	 in	
																																																																				
63	Article	1	of	the	Convention	reads	as	follows:	‘The	High	Contracting	Parties	shall	secure	to	everyone	within	
their	jurisdiction	the	rights	and	freedoms	defined	in	Section	I	of	this	Convention.’	
64	On	the	gradual	jurisprudential	construction	of	an	expansive	understanding	of	Article	13	see	Helfer,	above	n.	
53	at	144-146.	
65	Ibid.	at	141-149.	
66	Ibid.	
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order	to	abdicate	its	responsibility,	but	in	order	to	discharge	its	institutional	duty,	which	is	
to	enforce	the	Convention,	as	best	as	it	can.	
	
B.	Subsidiarity	
		
Subsidiarity	 considerations	 warrant	 similar	 conclusions.	 The	 principle	 of	 subsidiarity	 is	
firmly	grounded	in	the	context	of	the	ECHR	system.67	It	was	frequently	mentioned	and	used	
by	the	Court	even	before	Protocol	15	was	made	open	for	signature.68	The	principle	appears	
to	 flow	 naturally	 from	 some	 of	 the	 most	 basic	 structural	 institutional	 features	 of	 the	
Convention	system,	to	wit,	 the	obligation	of	States	Parties	to	primarily	secure	themselves	
the	 rights	 enshrined	 in	 the	 ECHR69	and	 the	 procedural	 rule	 of	 exhaustion	 of	 domestic	
remedies,	 combined	with	 the	obligation	 to	 invoke	alleged	violations	of	Convention	rights	
before	national	 authorities	on	pain	of	 inadmissibility.70	Moreover,	 and	apart	 from	 textual	
homes,	there	are	solid,	even	if	disputed,	reasons	to	think	that	subsidiarity	is	a	normatively	
appealing	principle	in	its	own	right.71				
	
Subsidiarity	 applies	 in	 circumstances	 involving	 the	 distribution	 of	 powers	 between	
decision-making	 bodies	 located	 at	 different	 levels.	 Typically,	 these	 include	 a	 higher-level	
central	 unit	 and	 lower-level	 sub-units.72	According	 to	 a	 standard	 definition,	 provided	 by	
Andreas	 Føllesdal,	 subsidiarity	 stipulates	 that	 when	 two	 bodies	 are	 concurrently	
responsible	for	exercising	the	same	power	
	
																																																																				
67	See	generally	P	Carozza,	‘Subsidiarity	as	a	Structural	Principle	of	International	Human	Rights	Law’	(2003)	
97	American	Journal	of	International	Law	38	at	40.	
68	In	 this	respect,	see	the	seminal	Belgian	Linguistic	Case	(23	July	1968,	Series	A	no.	6,	p.34	at	para	10)	and	
Handyside	v.	the	United	Kingdom,	7	December	1976,	(Application	No.	5493/72)	[1976]	ECHR	5;	more	recently,	
see	Selmouni	v.	France	(Grand	Chamber),	28	July	1999	(Application	No.	28503/94)	at	para	74.	
69	See	Article	1	ECHR.		
70	See	Article	35	para	1	ECHR.	The	Court	insists	that,	in	order	to	be	admissible,	the	complaint	to	the	effect	that	
a	Convention	rights	has	been	breached	has	to	be	raised	‘at	least	in	substance’.	See	Castells	v.	Spain,	23	April	
1992	(Application	No.	11798/85)	at	para	32.		
71	Carozza,	above	n	67	at	40-19;	see	also	A	von	Staden,	‘The	Democratic	Legitimacy	of	Judicial	Review	Beyond	
the	 State:	 Normative	 Subsidiarity	 and	 Judicial	 Standards	 of	 Review’	 (2012),	 10(4)	 International	 Journal	 of	
Constitutional	Law	1023	at	1033-1038.	
72	See	A	Føllesdal	‘Survey	Article:	Subsidiarity’	(1998)	6(2)	Journal	of	Political	Philosophy	190	at	193-197.	
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powers	 or	 tasks	 should	 rest	 with	 the	 lower-level	 sub-units	 of	 that	 order	 unless	
allocating	 them	 to	 a	 higher-level	 central	 unit	 would	 ensure	 higher	 comparative	
efficiency	or	effectiveness	in	achieving	them.73	
	
Correspondingly,	 under	 standard	 accounts	 subsidiarity	 puts	 forward	 a	 criterion	 of	
efficiency	when	 it	 comes	 to	 deciding	 whether	 to	 attribute	 decision-making	 power	 to	 a	
central	 unit	 in	 the	 realization	 of	 a	 commonly	 shared	 value	 or	 objective.	 Allocation	 of	
decision-making	power	 to	 the	central	unit	 is	 justified	 if	 that	allocation	 is	 the	best	way	of	
realizing	the	common	value	or	objective.		
	
Under	 standard	 accounts	 of	 subsidiarity,	 the	 link	 with	 MoA	 as	 an	 underenforcement	
doctrine	 appears	 direct:	 underenforcement	 of	 the	 Convention	 is	 justified	 whenever	
national	 authorities,	 because	 of	 their	 superior	 institutional	 abilities,	 are	 better	 placed	 to	
pass	judgment	on	the	interpretation	or	application	of	the	Convention	than	the	Court	itself.	
Conversely,	 the	 principle	 of	 subsidiarity	 is	 flouted	 whenever	 the	 Court	 tries	 by	 its	 own	
resource-bounded	 cognitive	 powers	 to	 decide	 on	 alleged	 violations	 of	 the	ECHR,	 if	 these	
could	be	more	reliably	tracked	by	deferring	to	the	judgment	of	national	institutions.	In	such	
circumstances,	underenforcement	of	the	ECHR	on	institutional	grounds	can	be	justified.	At	
the	heart	of	the	subsidiarity	argument	in	favour	of	underenforcement	uses	of	MoA	thus	lies	
a	 judgment	 about	 the	 comparative	 institutional	 abilities	 of	 resource-bounded	 candidate	
Convention	enforcers.	
	
C.	Legitimacy	
	
Legitimacy	 of	 the	 ECtHR	 is	 the	 third	 source	 of	 normative	 reasons	 that	 can	 justify	
underenforcement	of	the	Convention	in	an	important	number	of	cases.	Legitimacy	should	
here	 be	 understood	 in	 a	 normative,	 and	 indeed	 moralized,	 rather	 than	 descriptive	 or	
sociological	 way:	 it	 purports	 to	 articulate	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 various	 agents	
involved	 in	a	 shared	practice	ought	 to	pay	heed	 to	 the	 inputs	of	 their	partners	given	 the	
																																																																				
73	Ibid.	at	190.	
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point	 of	 the	 shared	 practice	 which,	 in	 our	 case,	 is	 to	 do	 with	 human	 rights	 protection.	
Legitimacy	 concerns	pertaining	 to	 international	 protection	of	 human	 rights,	 inasmuch	 as	
they	are	to	do	with	the	conditions	and	constraints	under	which	power	should	be	exercised	
on	 individuals,	 point	 to	 a	wide	 variety	 of	moral	 resources.	 Some	of	 these	 are	 to	 do	with	
normative	 doctrines	 of	 separation	 of	 powers74	properly	 transposed	 to	 the	 workings	 of	
international	 human	 rights	 regimes75:	 international	 judicial	 institutions	 thus	 ‘promote	
trustworthiness’ 76 	in	 domestic	 institutions,	 since	 they	 align	 the	 workings	 of	 these	
institutions	 with	 effective	 international	 oversight,	 providing	 an	 additional	 checks-and-
balances	 mechanism.	 This	 is,	 in	 a	 nutshell,	 one	 of	 the	 main	 rationales	 that	 can	 justify	
regional	human	rights	protection	of	the	kind	offered	by	the	ECHR	system.		
	
This	mechanism,	however,	 is	also	constrained	by	legitimacy	considerations	that	are	to	do	
with	the	Court’s	relationship	with	States	Parties.	Trustworthiness	is	not	a	one-way	street,	
nor	does	 it	 involve	only	two	players,	 to	wit,	 the	Court	and	 individuals.	Rather,	 it	 involves	
complex	normative	relationships	between	three	kinds	of	agents:	the	Court,	which	exercises	
interpretive	power	on	States	Parties	by	making	 the	 latter	abide	with	 its	decisions,	 States	
Parties	to	the	Convention	and	individuals	on	which	these	States	Parties	exercise	coercion.	
Under	these	conditions,	there	are	at	 least	two	kinds	of	normative	considerations	that	can	
justify	a	 suboptimal	 implementation	of	 the	Convention	by	 the	ECtHR	 through	MoA.	First,	
traditional	concerns	to	do	with	democratic	legitimacy77:	courts,	international	and	domestic	
alike,	 sometimes	 have	 to	 balance	 substantive	 reasons,	 akin	 to	 the	 protection	 of	 rights,	
against	 procedural	 ones,	 pertaining	 to	 the	 democratic	 credentials	 of	 a	 given	 political	
decision.	In	so	doing,	they	may	well	chose	to	sustain	a	political	decision	that	appears	wrong	
under	 their	 own	 lights,	 because	 it	 is	 a	 decision	 arrived	 at	 through	 a	 suitably	 democratic	
procedure.	 Second,	 insofar	as	human	rights	 issues	 can	be	cognitively	demanding,	 as	 they	
typically	are	 in	hard	cases,	 they	may	well	become	the	object	of	reasonable	disagreement.	
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75	See	A	Føllesdal,	‘The	Legitimacy	of	International	Human	Rights	Review:	The	Case	of	the	European	Court	of	
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Where	 there	 is	 reasonable	 disagreement	 about	 the	 content	 of	 Convention	 rights,	 the	
question	of	legitimacy	becomes	pressing:	under	which	conditions	should	the	Court	exercise	
its	 interpretive	 power	 over	 States	 Parties?	 Here	 again,	 it	 appears	 acceptable,	 at	 least	 in	
some	cases,	to	use	MoA	in	order	to	drive	a	wedge	between	an	optimal	moral	understanding	
of	the	content	of	Convention	rights	in	the	abstract	and	the	right	way	to	decide	outcomes,	i.e.	
to	exercise	power	on	States.	
	
	
Conclusion	
The	 aim	 of	 this	 chapter	 was	 modest:	 to	 lend	 some	 initial	 plausibility	 to	 an	
underenforcement	 reading	 of	 MoA.	 After	 an	 attempt	 at	 clarification	 of	 the	 concept	 of	
underenforcement,	 I	 contended	 that	 underenforcement	 uses	 of	MoA	 could	 be	 explained,	
among	 other	 things,	 by	 appealing	 to	 considerations	 to	 do	 with	 the	 resource-bounded	
interpretive	 activity	 of	 the	 Court.	 It	 is	 a	 somewhat	 peculiar	 feature	 of	 academic	 legal	
scholarship	 that	 adjudication	 is	 usually	 represented	not	 as	 the	 activity	 of	 real-life	 judges	
marked	 by	 specific	 constraints,	 but	 as	 that	 of	 idealised	 decision-makers	 in	 a	 frictionless	
world.	 The	 chapter	 claims	 that	 this	 tendency	 should	 be	 firmly	 resisted,	 since	 it	 tends	 to	
obscure	 underenforcement	 judicial	 doctrines,	 such	 as	 MoA.	 Absent	 a	 specification	 of	
institutional	 considerations,	 MoA	 appears	 to	 be	 either	 a	 relativist	 doctrine	 or	 else	 an	
outright	 abdication	 of	 judicial	 responsibility.	 Both	 of	 these	 possibilities	 are	 justifiably	
unattractive	to	friends	of	Convention	rights.	However,	the	suggestion	of	this	chapter	is	that	
they	 are	 hardly	 necessary	 corollaries	 of	 MoA.	 In	 fact,	 once	 we	 unpack	MoA	 in	 terms	 of	
underenforcement,	 it	 becomes	 possible	 to	 explain	 and	 justify	 MoA	 by	 appealing	 to	
specifically	 institutional	considerations,	without	presupposing	any	kind	of	relativism.	The	
chapter	 suggests	 that	 normative	 institutional	 reasons	 pertaining	 to	 subsidiarity,	 shared	
responsibility	 and	 legitimacy	 in	 the	 enforcement	 of	 the	 Convention	 could	 justify,	 under	
certain	circumstances,	underenforcement	of	the	ECHR	through	MoA.	However,	much	more	
needs	to	be	said	on	this	front.	I	submit,	then,	that,	in	order	to	come	to	a	more	correct	view	
of	 MoA,	 it	 is	 high	 time	 we	 started	 exploring	 actively	 the	 complex	 normative	 and	
explanatory	issues	posed	by	institutional	considerations	and	the	resource-boundedness	of	
Convention	enforcers.	
